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RECENT CASES

this section would be unconstitutional on the grounds that it permits the
military direct control over a civilian. A possible solution, however, might be
in the establishing of a commissioner's office, whose duty it would be to
regulate the passing of prior military offenders from civilian control back into
military channels, thereby creating harmony between the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and our Federal Constitution.
CLINTON R. OTTMAR

SALES-REMEDIES

OF BUYER-LIABILITY

RETAILER FOR DAMAGES

OF MANUFACTURER -70 REIMBURSE

PAID TO CONSUMER FOR BREACH OF EXPRESS WAR-

RANTY.-The defendant manufactured a stepladder and sold it to a retailer with
an express warranty of fitness. The retailer resold it to a customer with a
similar warranty. The customer, injured when the stepladder collapsed, sued
the retailer and recovered a sizeable verdict. Although the retailer notified
the defendant of the commencement of the purchaser's suit and demanded
that it take over the defense, the defendant refused. The plaintiff, an insurance
company which reimbursed the retailer for the damages be was compelled to
pay, brought suit against the defendant to recover the sum thus paid.
Held, judgment for plaintiff as a matter of law. Defendant manufacturer,
having been given notice of the pendency of the suit by the customer against
the retailer, was bound by the result in the prior action on the principle of
res judicata. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. J. R. Clark Co., 59 N.W.2d 899
(Minn. 1953).
The underlying rule applied in this case is one which is apparently "well
settled, that where a person is responsible over to another, either by operation
of law or express contract and he is duly notified by the pendency of the suit
against the person to whom he is liable over and full opportunity is afforded
him to defend the action, the judgment, if obtained without fraud or collusion,
will be conclusive against him whether he appears or not." 1 The same principle
has often been applied in cases of warranty of title,2 as well as in negligence
3
cases. Most of the authorities cited in the instance case involved either cases
4
of recovery on implied warranties or for negligent manufacture. The holding
5
is thus not confined to cases involving express warranties.

1. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Strait Scales Co., 322 Mo. 502, 15 S.W.2d
766 (1929).
2. Goldberg v. Sisseton Loan & Title Co., 24 S.D. 49, 123 N.W. 266 (1909); 3
Williston, Sales §615a (Rev. ed. 1948).
3. Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896); Consolidated
Hand-Method Lasting-Mach. Co. v. Bradley, 171 Mass. 127, 50' N.E. 464 (1898).
4. Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630 (1886) (implied warranty); Dayton Power &
Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 187 Fed. 439 (6th Cir. 1923); Boston
Woven Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657 (1901) (implied
warranty); see Pfarr v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Iowa 657, 146 N.W. 851, 855 (1914).
5. Reichard, Inc. v. Dunwoody Co., 45 F.Supp. 153 (E.D.Pa. 1942); Aldridge Motors
v. Alexander, 217 N.C. 750, 9 S.E.2d 469 (1940); Gerst v. Jones & Co., 32 Gratt. 518
(Va. 1879) (A manufacturer sold. a grower some tobacco boxes for the grower to pack
his tobacco in. The boxes were green and molded the tobacco, causing the grower to
sell defective goods to his customers. The grower recovered on an implied warranty of
fitness.).
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The majority of the courts hold that the consumer cannot sue the manufacturer directly for breach of either implied 6 or express 7 warranty, because
there is no privity of contract between them. There are, however, clear
indications that this rule is being subjected to increasing attrition through
the growth of numerous exceptions regarding particular types of articles, e.g.,
food.s Where the consumer can prove negligence in manufacture, either by
direct proof or indirectly on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, he
can, in addition, maintain an action sounding in tort.9 The argument among
those who oppose the privity of contract restriction on the liability of
manufacturers is that the rule that privity is required creates an inequity
because much of the demand for the product is created and many of the
assurances are made solely by the manufacturer through the medium of
advertising.10 The Uniform Commercial Code contains provisions which
raise an implied warranty for a particular purpose by the retailer if any
reliance at all on the part of the purchaser can be shown,11 and in addition,
makes it simpler to establish express warranties 12 and implied warranties as
to merchantability.13 It remains true, however, that the courts appear to be
more lenient in permitting joinder of a manufacturer and retailer in cases
based on a theory of negligence than in cases based on the theory of breach of
warranty, reasoning that the liabilities are more likely to differ in the cases
involving warranties than in those involving negligence.14 It is generally held
that it is not necessary for the warranties to be identical to permit a recovery
uder the rule of the instant case, so long as the warranty from the manufacturer
is "substantially" the same as the warranty from the dealer to the subpurchaser. 15

In cases such as the present one, a few courts have held that the manufacturer's liability is limited to those items of damages which were foreseeable
when the warranty was given. 1 6 The general rule, however, is that the retailer
who is held liable is entitled to recover an amount which will be sufficient to
6. Pellerton v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925); Chysky v. Drake Bros.,
235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923) (plaintiff ate some cake in a restaurant and the
cake had a nail in it; plaintiff brought suit against the persons that had baked the cake
and sold it to the restaurant and *the court entered judgment for defendant on the
grounds that there was no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant).
7. Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937); Standard Oil Co. v.
Murray, 119 Fed. 572 (7th Cir. 1902).
8. Ketterer v. Armour, 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); Davis v. Van Camp Packing
Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920); Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Simpson, 158
Miss. 390, 130 So. 479 (1930); Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R.I. 43, 144
Atl. 884 (1929); Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80 (1915).
9. Bissonette v. National Biscuit Co., 100 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1939); Parks v. C. C.
Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1920); Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92,
64 N.E.2d 693 (1946); Beaumont Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Guillot, 222 S.W.2d 141
(Tex. Civ App. 1949).
10. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932); Note, 26 N.Dak.
L.Rev. 173 (1950).
11. Uniform Commercial Code §2-315.
12. Id. §2-313.
13. Id. §2-314.
14. See Silver v. Morgan Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.Ky. 1936) Probst v.
Hinesley, 133 Ky. 64, 117 S.W. 389 (1909); Kniess v. Armour, 134 Ohio St. 432, 17
N.E.2d 734 (1938); Canton Provision Co. v. Gauderk 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634
(1935); Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones, 29 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.Civ.App. 1930).
15. Reichard, Inc. v. Dunwoody Co., 45 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.Pa. 1942).
16.. Fred Wolstenholme, Inc. v. Jos. Randall & Bro., Inc., 295 Pa. 131, 144 At. 909
(1929); see Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc., 185 Misc. 689, 57 N.Y.S.2d
707, 709 (1945).
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compensate him for what he has lost as a result of the breach of warranty
by the manufacturer, including the legal expenses incurred in defending the
prior suit. This is on the theory that the retailer would never have had to
7
defend the suit had it not been for tthe manufacturer's breach of warranty.'
There is authority for the ruling that even though the original buyer or retailer
has not yet been held liable to his vendee, the amount of his probable liability
8
may be recovered from the original seller.1
ROBERT E.

KLEVE

17. Reichard, Inc. v. Dunwoody Co., 45 F.Supp. 153 (E.D.Pa. 1942) (permitted
recovery of all expenses, including attorney's fees); Pezel v. Yerex, 205 Pac. 475 (Cal.
App. 1922) (permitted all costs but attorney's fees, saying that if each sub-vendee were
permitted to recover attorney's fees, by the time the original vendor was sued, the
attorney's fees would be more than the article was worth); Carleton v. Lombard Ayres &
Co., 46 N.Y.S. 120 (1897) (permitted recovery of attorney's fees).
18. Hubbard Steel Foundry Co. v. Federal Bridge Co., 169 Wis. 277, 171 N.W. 949
(1919); 3 Williston, Contracts §1355 (Rev. ed. 1937).

